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Abstract: To secure e-health communications, key management protocols play a vital role in the
security process. Nevertheless, current e-health systems are unable to run existing standardised key
management protocols due to their limited energy power and computational capabilities. In this paper,
we introduce two solutions to tailor MIKEY-Ticket protocol to a such constrained environment.
Firstly, we propose a new header compression scheme to reduce the size of MIKEY’s header from
12 Bytes to 3 Bytes in the best compression case. Secondly, we present a new exchange mode to
reduce the number of exchanged messages from 6 to 4. We use a formal validation tool to evaluate
and validate the security properties of our tailored MIKEY-Ticket protocol. In addition, we evaluate
both communication and computational costs to demonstrate the energy gain. The results show
a decrease in MIKEY-Ticket overhead and a considerable energy gain without compromising its
security properties.
Keywords: e-health; IoT; internet of things; MIKEY-Ticket; security; key management; data
confidentiality.
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Abdmeziem, M.R., Tandjaoui, D. and
Romdhani, I. (xxxx) ‘Lightweighted and energy-aware MIKEY-Ticket for e-health applications in
the context of internet of things’, Int. J. Sensor Networks, Vol. x, No. x, pp.xxx–xxx.
Biographical notes: Mohammed Riyadh Abdmeziem is a Postdoctoral Researcher at Loria-Inria
(University of Lorraine, France). He received his PhD in Computer Science from the University of
Sciences and Technology Houari Boumedienne (Algeria) in 2016. He has been awarded his Master
degree in Software Engineering as the top of the 2012 class from the same university. His research
activities are focused on security, confidentiality, and key management protocols. He managed to
publish several papers at an international level in conference proceedings, book chapters, and journals.
Djamel Tandjaoui is a Researcher at the Center for Research on Scientific and Technical Information
(CERIST) in Algiers, Algeria since 1999. He received his PhD from the University of Science and
Technology Houari Boumediene (USTHB), Algiers in 2005. He obtained a Master degree and an
Engineer degree in Computer Science from the same university. At present, he is a Member of
Computer Security Research Division at CERIST. His research interest includes mobile networks,
mesh networks, sensor networks, ad hoc networks, QoS and security.
Imed Romdhani is an Associate Professor at Edinburgh Napier University. He received his PhD
in Computer Science from the University of Technology of Compiegne, France in 2005. Before
Copyright © 20xx Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.
2 M.R. Abdmeziem et al.
joining Edinburgh Napier, he was a network R&D engineer at Motorola Labs in Paris. He is an
ActiveMember of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). He contributed to form theMultiMob
(multicast mobility) working group to standardise IP mobile multicast communication protocols and
reviewed many internet drafts and standards including RFC 5757, RFC6224 and RFC6636.
This paper is a revised and expanded version of a paper entitled ‘Tailoring Mikey-Ticket to e-Health
applications in the context of internet of things’ presented at InternationalConference onNetworking,
Distributed Systems, and Applications (INDS), Bejaia, Algeria, 17–19 June, 2014.
1 Introduction
Internet of things (IoT) is one of the main communication
development in the last decade. According to Atzori et al.
(2010), the basic concept behind the IoT is the pervasive
presence of various wireless technologies such as radio-
frequency identification (RFID) tags, sensors, actuators or
mobile phones in which computing and communication
systems are seamlessly embedded. Throughunique addressing
schemes, these objects interact with each other and cooperate
to achieve common tasks.
Technology advances along with increasing demand will
foster a widespread deployment of IoT’s services, which
would radically transform our corporations, communities and
personal spheres. From the perspective of a private user,
IoT’s introduction will play a leading role in several services.
E-health is seen as one of the most interesting applications
as it will provide medical monitoring to millions of elderly
and disabled patients while preserving their autonomy and
comfort. By using body sensors, physiological data is
gathered and transmitted to qualified medical staff that can
intervene in the case of emergency. Nevertheless, e-health
applications are unlikely to fulfil a widespread deployment
until they provide strong security foundations. Securing
communications in e-health applications necessarily passes
through key management protocols that distribute security
credentials between involved entities. However, the lack of
energy power and computational capabilities in such kind
of environment hinder the deployment of classic developed
security solutions.
MIKEY-Ticket (Mattsson and Tian, 2011) is a key
management protocol characterised by its simplicity and
adaptation to centralised architectures. In fact, these
architectures are interesting to be considered for resource
constrained environments, as there is no need to pre-
distribute credentials. By using these kinds of architectures,
users can request security credentials only when required.
Centralised solutions also scale well when the number of
users grows. Additionally, MIKEY-Ticket specifies different
message exchanges that can be transported over UDP and
integrated within several security protocols (e.g., IPSEC,
DTLS, HIP).
MIKEY-Ticket needs to be tailored for constrained
environments in order to adapt to resources constraints of such
environments. To this end, we introduce two solutions to tailor
MIKEY-Ticket to e-health environments without weakening
its security properties. In the first solution, we propose a
new 6LoWPAN (IPv6 over low-power wireless personal area
networks) header compression scheme for MIKEY-Ticket.
Our scheme is intended to save energy and avoid 6LoWPAN
fragmentation that may occur when a datagram size exceeds
the link layer (maximum transmission unit (MTU) of the IEEE
802.15.4 protocol). Indeed, fragmentation is undesirable, as
6LoWPAN is vulnerable to fragmentation attacks (Hummen
et al., 2013b). In the second solution, we propose a new
exchange mode to reduce the number of exchanged messages
from 6 to 4. Themain concern being to reduce the involvement
of the constrained nodes in the exchange process.
To assess our proposed adjusted MIKEY-Ticket protocol
with respect to its security properties and energy savings, we
have proceededwith a theoretical analysis that we have further
formally validated through an implementation in Avispa tool
(http://www.avispa-project.org). In addition, based on energy
models that consider both communication and computational
costs, we have estimated the energy savings at the constrained
nodes side. Our results show a progressive gain of energy cost
according to the compression rate level while preserving the
MIKEY-Ticket security properties.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2,
e-health applications in the context of IoT are briefly
introduced along with the main security threats that might
limit their deployment. Thereafter, we provide in Section 3
an overview of the state-of-the-art of the proposed security
approaches. In Section 4, we introduce the motivations behind
our choice of MIKEY-Ticket over other existing protocols.
Furthermore, for a proper understanding of our contribution,
we also present the different technologies used. We outline
our network scenario in Section 5. In Section 6, we describe
in detail how we have adjusted MIKEY-Ticket. Both security
and quantitative analysis of our contribution are provided in
Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper and gives
future directions.
2 E-health applications in the context of internet
of things
Internet of things deployment will open doors to a huge
number of applications that would deeply improve our daily
life. E-health applications are one of the typical applications
that are gaining more and more attention (Atzori et al., 2010).
An e-health system is defined as a radio-frequency-based
wireless networking technology that provides ubiquitous
networking functionalities. It is based on the interconnection
of tiny nodes enhanced with sensing and/or actuating
capabilities planted, or placed around the human body.
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E-health applications are context-aware, personal, dynamic
and anticipative by nature. As IoT is designed to meet
these key characteristics, it provides a natural and suitable
environment for their efficient deployment. In fact, an
extensive research study on using IoT paradigm in e-health
has recently been reported (Istepanian et al., 2010). Population
ageing and the increase of survival chances from disabling
accidents and illnesses will lead to an increased demand from
today’s population that requires a continuous healthcare and
monitoring (Dohr et al., 2010).
E-health applications could spare a patient from being
admitted in hospitals for a long period of time. Reducing
the number of nights that a patient may spend in a hospital
and the associated risks that may result is a key area of
focus for the medical community. Additionally, a continuous
monitoring capability, if available, can anticipate the need for
an emergency intervention. Moreover, early stage diagnostics
could also be achieved remotely (Patel and Wang, 2010). In
brief, e-health applications in the context of IoT constitute
a cost-effective and unobtrusive solution that is of the best
interest of today’s patients. Nevertheless, e-health applications
are seriously challenged by many security threats that limit
their large scale deployment.
Studies in Li and Lou (2010), Javadi and Razzaque (2013),
Lim et al. (2010) and Ng et al. (2006) have underlined that
e-health applications might be more vulnerable to attacks
compared to other IoT applications as the generated data
is highly sensitive and private. The health-related records
are always private in nature, and any security breach in
the confidentiality of such data would seriously repulse
patients from adopting e-health solutions. For instance, many
people would not like their personal health information, such
as early stage of pregnancy or details of certain medical
conditions, be divulged to third parties (Ameen et al., 2012).
In fact, the eavesdropped communications could be used for
several illegal purposes. Moreover, any eventual modification
of health-related captured data could lead to disastrous
consequences as it could engenderwrongmedical prescription
or delay an emergency intervention.
Classical countermeasures are not suitable to the
constrained environment of IoT due to several factors such
as power and computation limitations, the weak reliability of
wireless links and the scalability issue. Thus, a considerable
effort has been made by the research community to provide
viable solutions to secure IoT applications. The next section
provides an in-depth overview of the state-of-the-art of the
proposed security approaches and explains the motivations
behind our contribution.
3 Related work
The research community attempted to propose security
protocols that take into consideration the constrained
resources of IoT. In this context, we distinguish two distinct
research directions:
 specific solutions for e-health applications
 the tailoring of standard security protocols for the
IP-based IoT.
Several specific solutions for e-health applications have been
proposed in the literature. For instance, hardware solutions
are proposed to deal with the scarcity of resources (Healy
et al., 2008;Meingast et al., 2006). However, these approaches
still present some drawbacks as they do not offer advanced
encryption standard (AES) decryption (only base stations can
decrypt the transmitted data). In addition, they are highly
platform-dependant and not all the nodes are equipped with
hardware encryption capabilities. Besides, TinySec is part
of the official TinyOS release that aims to achieve link-
layer encryption and authentication of data in biomedical
sensors (Karlof et al., 2004). This protocol is based on a
single key shared among nodes which constitutes its main
weakness as node capture would give access to the entire
network. A different approach based on biometric techniques
is therefore proposed (Cherukuri et al., 2003; Poon et al.,
2006). These techniques use the human body to manage the
key establishment process based on physiological values (e.g.,
electrocardiogram).
A different but complementary research direction has
seen several interesting approaches that aim to tailor
security protocols for the IP-based IoT. The main focus of
these works is to make standard based security protocols
suitable for constrained IoT environments. In particular,
several compression schemes for the IP-based IoT have
been proposed. The compression of IPv6 headers, extension
headers along with user datagram protocol (UDP) headers
has been standardised through the 6LoWPAN adaptation
layer in Montenegro et al. (2007) and Hui and Thubert
(2011). Moreover, authors in Granjal et al. (2010) and Raza
et al. (2011) have presented 6LoWPAN based compression
techniques for IPsec payload headers: authentication header
(AH) and encapsulating security payload (ESP), that have
been later standardised in Raza et al. (2013a). Besides, an
internet key exchange (IKE) compression scheme has been
also proposed in order to provide a lightweight automatic way
to establish security associations for IPsec (Raza et al., 2012b).
Likewise, header compression layers for datagram transport
layer security (DTLS) andhost identity protocol dietExchange
(HIPDEX)were respectively introduced inRaza et al. (2012a)
and Hummen et al. (2013a).
Apart from packet compression schemes, several
delegation procedures of protocol’s primitives have been
proposed to offload the computational load to third entities.
Saied and Olivereau (2012a), Saied and Olivreau (2012) and
Saied and Olivereau (2012b) have introduced collaboration
for HIP (Host Identity Protocol). The idea is to take
advantage of more powerful nodes in the neighbourhood of a
constrained node to carry heavy computations in a distributed
way. Likewise, IKE session establishment delegation to
the gateway have been proposed in Bonetto et al. (2012).
Furthermore, authors in Freeman et al. (2007) have introduced
a delegation procedure that enables a client to delegate the
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certificate validation process to a third party. While delegation
approaches reduce the computational load at the constrained
node, they introduce the use of a trusted third party. As a result,
the end to end property is no longer ensured with respect to
protocols, which initially were designed to ensure it. Further
design improvement approaches have been introduced to tailor
end-to-end security protocols to IoT. For example, authors
in Hummen et al. (2013c) have proposed complementary
lightweight extensions to HIP DEX that could be generalised
to DTLS and IKE. Following the same way, Hummen et al.
(2013d) have introduced design ideas to reduce the overhead
of the DTLS handshake where their primary goal was to make
the use of certificates for authentication purposes viable in IoT
contexts. Besides, Boudguiga et al. (2013) have proposed an
approach to mitigate the DoS attack in MIKEY-Ticket.
We do believe that securing IoT applications will be
achieved through tailoring current security protocols to IoT
environments rather than developing new specific solutions.
To the best of our knowledge, no prior solutions have
been proposed to tailor the MIKEY-Ticket protocol to the
constrained IoT environment.
4 Background
4.1 MIKEY-Ticket choice
In this subsection, we focus on the motivations that are behind
our choice of MIKEY-Ticket over other existing protocols,
particularly IKE. This latter is a key exchange protocol that
aims to perform mutual authentication and to provide security
associations (SAs) to be used as input for IPsec. Indeed,
securing IoT communications at the IP level is likely to be
achieved through the use of IPsec (Keoh et al., 2014). In
this way, MIKEY-Ticket aims to achieve the same goal. In
our study, we have focused on MIKEY-Ticket instead of the
widely adopted IKE. The reasons behind this choice are the
following.
 The proposed e-health constrained scenario involves the
use of tiny nodes that are highly limited by their
computational capabilities. In fact, during its first
request/response exchange process (i.e.,
IKE_SA_INIT), IKE involves the two parties in a
Diffie-Hellman instantiation phase, which requires an
important energy consumption due to exponential
operations. Indeed, Public key operations are not
suitable for highly constrained environments. Besides,
the Pre-Shared mode of MIKEY-Ticket only involves
symmetric operations, which are much more energy
saving compared to asymmetric approaches (Wander
et al., 2005). Furthermore, Mikey- Ticket is designed to
involve a central trusted entity which makes it more
suitable to our network scenario compared to IKE. The
trusted entity has a double role to play. Firstly, it acts as
a gateway (i.e., 6LoWPAN Border Router) through
which 6loWPAN headers are compressed and
decompressed. Secondly, it spares the constrained node
from using public key cryptography by generating and
distributing the required security credentials.
 MIKEY-Ticket is a product of the IETF such as IKE
(Kaufman et al., 2010), DTLS(E.Rescorla, 2011) and
other standard based protocols. In fact, our approach to
address data confidentiality in IoT’s applications aims
to propose new extensions to standardised protocols in
order to adapt them to the IoT context. Following this
approach, MIKEY-Ticket sounds to be the adequate
protocol that can be extended to ensure secure
communications in IoT.
 A lot of efforts have been carried out by the research
community to optimise the IKE protocol. As IoT is only
in its first stages of deployment, the protocol suite that
should be implemented to secure IoT-based applications
is not clear yet. Our research effort attempts, therefore,
to bring a contribution in this process of adapting and
selecting existing protocols for IoT environments.
4.2 MIKEY-Ticket overview
MIKEY-Ticket (Mattsson and Tian, 2011) is a key distribution
protocol designed to enhance the multimedia internet keying
protocol (MIKEY) (Arkko et al., 2004). It defines new modes
of key distribution which are well adapted to centralised
based scenarios where a third trusted entity is available.
MIKEY-Ticket considers two entities that aim to establish a
shared secret. One of the two entities assumes the initiator
role whereas the second one assumes the responder role.
The key establishment relies on a key management server
to generate and deliver the needed credentials. Such design
spares the peers from a pre-distribution phase that would
require credentials storing. Instead, peers can request such
credentials only when required. In this work, we only consider
the pre-shared key mode (PSK) of MIKEY-Ticket as the
public key (PK) mode and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
mode are ruled out due to their inadequacy with IoT
constrained environments.
We provide a brief description of MIKEY-Ticket message
exchanges and the general MIKEY header (HDR) format.
Table 1 summarises the used notations.
Table 1 Terminology table
Notation Description
I Initiator
R Responder
KMS Key management server
XID The identity ofX
NX Nonce generated byX
KX;Y Shared key betweenX and Y
aKX;Y Shared authentication key betweenX and Y
eKX;Y Shared encryption key betweenX and Y
[data]K Data encrypted with the keyK
Ticket Object used to identify and deliver keys
4.2.1 Message exchanges
MIKEY-Ticket uses six messages to establish a new key
between the initiator I and the responder R (see Figure 1). The
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protocol relies on the key management server (KMS) which
delivers the generated key. The Initiator and the Responder do
not share any credentials. Instead, they share a secret master
key with theKMS. This key is used to derive an authentication
key and an encryption key. The generated keys are used to
secure the communication between I and R whereas KMS
provides data authenticity, data integrity and confidentiality.
We briefly describe the content of each exchangedmessage
of the full three round-trip MIKEY-Ticket mode:
REQUEST_INIT : Through this message, node I expresses its
willingness to establish a shared keywith nodeR. Themessage
contains information about the responder’s identity. To ensure
authenticity, a message authentication code (MAC), which is
computed with aKI;KMS, is included.
REQUEST_RESP: After successful verification, the request is
authorised and the KMS generates the requested key K and
encodes it in a ticket. The message is sent to I.
TRANSFER_INIT : Upon reception of REQUEST_RESP
message, node I derives an authentication key aK and an
encryption key eK to secure data transmission between
I and R. Then, node I transfers the ticket to R through
TRANSFER_INIT message. Also, aMAC is computed using
aK and included in the message.
RESOLVE_INIT : through this message, node R asks the KMS
to return the key K encoded in the ticket. The message is
protected by aMAC based on aKKMS;R.
RESOLVE_RESP: if node R is authorised to receive the
generated key encoded in the ticket, the KMS sends
RESOLVE_RESP message that includes the generated key
K. The message is protected through encryption and a MAC
message based on aKKMS;R.
TRANSFER_RESP: R is in possession of the generated key K.
TRANSFER_INIT’sMAC can thus be checked. The exchange
is concluded through TRANSFER_RESP message to prove
the correct reception and derivation of the generated session
key.
It is worth noticing that the different messages contain a nonce
for protection against replay attacks.
Figure 1 depicts the signalling for the full three round-
trip MIKEY-Ticket mode. Nevertheless, RFC 6043 (Mattsson
and Tian, 2011) introduces four different modes according
to the specificities of both the Initiator and the Responder.
Mode 1 represents actually the full three round-trip mode
where only the KMS is in charge of generating, deriving
and distributing the keying materials. Both I and R have
to request/resolve messages with the KMS. In mode 2,
the exchanges between the KMS and R are omitted (i.e.,
RESOLVE_INIT and RESOLVE_RESP ). However, R has
to be able to resolve the ticket without assistance from
the KMS. In mode 3, the ticket request exchange (i.e.,
REQUEST_INIT and REQUEST_RESP) can be omitted if I is
able to create the keying materials without an assistance from
KMS. Mode 4 only contains a ticket transfer exchange (i.e.,
TRANSFER_INIT ). However, it requires from I andR to share
security credentials prior to the start of the protocol session.
Figure 1 MIKEY-Ticket full three round-trip mode exchange
(RFC 6043)
4.2.2 Common header format (HDR)
The common header payload (see Figure 2) contains
information about the different exchanged messages. It is
always present as the first payload in each message. In the
following, we present a succinct description of each field
contained in the Mikey_Ticket header. We refer to RFC3038
(Arkko et al., 2004) and RFC6043 (Mattsson and Tian, 2011)
for a more detailed description:
 Version (8 bits): Version of Mikey.
 Data type (8 bits): Type of the exchanged message.
 Next Payload (8 bits): Identifies the payload added after
the current payload.
 V (1 bit): Flag to indicate the use of a verification
message.
 PRF func (7 bits): Indicates the key derivation function.
 CSB ID (32 bits): Crypto session bundle (CSB) is a
collection of one or more crypto sessions (CS). CSB ID
field identifies the CSB.
 ] CS (8 bits): A crypto session refers to a data steam
protected by a single instance of a security protocol. ]
CS field indicates the number of crypto sessions within
the CBS.
 CS ID map type (8 bits): Specifies the method of
uniquely mapping crypto sessions to the security
protocol sessions.
 CS ID map info (variable length): Identifies and maps
crypto sessions to the security protocol sessions.
Figure 2 MIKEY common header format (RFC 3830)
4.3 6LoWPAN adaptation layer
The 6LoWPAN standard defined in Hui and Thubert
(2011) aims to transfer IPv6 packets to IEEE 802.15.4
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based networks. 6LoWPAN uses IPV6 header compression
mechanisms of IPv6 datagrams.Compressionmechanisms are
motivated by the limited space available in 802.15.4 frames
to encapsulate IPv6 packets. In fact, the size of the 802.15.4
frame payload (102 bytes) leaves limited space for an IPv6
packet as 48 bytes are required only for its header. 6LoWPAN
defines encoding formats for compression based on shared
state within contexts. In other words, it takes advantage of the
fields that are implicitly known to all nodes in the network or
can be deduced from theMAC layer. The compression scheme
consists of IP header compression (IPHC) and next header
compression (NHC).
IPHC encoding describes how an IPv6 header is
compressed. As depicted in Figure 3, 13 bits of the 2
bytes long IPHC are used for compression. The IPv6
header fields that are not compressed are placed immediately
after IPHC. Moreover, NH field in IPHC indicates whether
the following header is encoded using NHC. If so, NHC
encoding follows immediately the compressed IPv6 header.
Compression formats for different next headers are identified
by a variable ID bits plus the specific header compression
encoding bits. The NHC to encode IPv6 extension headers
and UDP header are already defined. For more details on
6LoWPAN,we refer the reader toRFC6282 (Hui andThubert,
2011).
Figure 3 IPHC
5 Network scenario
We consider a scenario of an e-health application where smart
objects (contextual sensors), gateways and remote entities are
used (see Figure 4). IP-enabled smart objects are in charge
of sensing health-related data (e.g., blood pressure, blood
glucose level, temperature level, etc.). They are planted in the
human body. Gateways connect these objects to a backend
infrastructure such as the internet. It is worth mentioning that
user’s smartphones could be used as gateways. Remote entities
are in charge of processing and analysing the received data.
Smart objects have limited computational power, memory
and energy resources, whereas gateways are much less
resource constrained and are comparable to standard routers.
Remote entities can take the formof a server hardware or being
distributed in a Cloud infrastructure with dynamic resources.
The mapping with MIKEY-Ticket concepts is defined as
follows:
 Initiator: Smart object (e.g., IP-enabled tiny sensor).
 Key management server: Gateway (e.g., smartphone).
 Responder: Remote entity (e.g., servers disposed in
hospitals).
Securing e-health applications relies on efficient key
management schemes that ensure reliable key distribution.We
do believe that the best approach to tackle security challenges
in the evolving IoT is to focus our efforts on standard based
protocols. We have chosen MIKEY-Ticket for its simplicity
and its adaptation to centralised scenarios which suits well
our e-health application. However, current key management
protocols such as MIKEY-Ticket were designed to be used
in an unconstrained environment which does not take into
consideration resources limitation. In the next section, we
present in detail our contribution to make MIKEY-Ticket
more lightweight while preserving its security properties.
Figure 4 Network scenario
6 Reducing the overhead of MIKEY-Ticket
To reduce the communication overhead of MIKEY-Ticket
protocol when implemented on constrained entities, we have
adopted two complementary approaches. Firstly, we have
reduced the size of the exchanged messages by proposing
a new header compression scheme. Secondly, we have
minimised the number of exchanged control messages by
proposing a new exchange mode.
6.1 New header compression scheme
In this section, we describe our proposed 6LoWPAN header
compression scheme for MIKEY-Ticket. Our compression
is based on the fact that the fields which are implicitly
known to all entities in the network or those that can be
deduced from the MAC layer can be removed. As explained
in Section 4.2, the NHC is used to encode the IPv6 extension
headers andUDPheader.Nevertheless, despite 6LoWPANhas
defined header compression for UDP, no NHC compression is
defined in the case where headers contained in UDP payloads
are compressed. In fact, MIKEY-Ticket common header is
contained in the UDP payload. Therefore, we propose to use
the 6LoWPAN extension proposed in Raza et al. (2012a) to
extend 6LoWPAN header compression mechanisms. These
extensions indicate that the headers of protocols that are part
of the UDP payload are compressed with 6LoWPAN-NHC.
The MIKEY-Ticket common header is 12 bytes long. It
is appended to each packet through the different exchanged
messages. We propose a 6LoWPAN-NHC to compress
MIKEY-Ticket header called 6LoWPAN-NHC-HDR. The
proposed approach allows reducing the header length from
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12 bytes to 3 bytes (2 bytes for our 6LoWPAN-NHC-HDR
plus 1 byte for the Next Payload field that is always carried
inline) in the best compression case. In fact, only 13 bits are
required to encode the different fields.Nevertheless, in order to
remain standard compliant (i.e., the size of NHC encodings is
multiple of bytes), our 6LoWPAN-NHC-HDR is 2 bytes long.
6LoWPAN-NHC encoding schemes do not limit the length
or the value of the NHC-ID. However, the NHC-ID must be
unique in order to distinguish the various existing compressed
6LoWPAN headers (e.g., IPv6, UDP, IPsec, DTLS, IKE).
Thus, the first four bits implement the ID field to uniquely
identify our NHC encoding. We set the ID bits to 1100.
To the best of our knowledge, the 1100 bits are currently
unused as NHC identifiers. In the following, we present in
detail the encoding approach for each field (see Table 2 and
Figure 5).
 Version (V): If 0, the version is the default and latest
MIKEY-Ticket version defined in Arkko et al. (2004)
and the field is skipped. If future versions are
defined, the bit is set to 1 and the version number is
carried inline after the 6LoWPAN-NHC-HDR header.
Our compression is thus kept dynamic and flexible.
 Data type (DT): the data type field describes the type of
the exchanged messages. Based on our new exchange
mode (See Section 4.1), we only consider three types of
messages (i.e., REQUEST_INIT,
REQUEST_RESPONSE, TRANSFER_END) plus the
ERROR type. In addition, only the pre-shared key
(PSK) mode is considered. The other modes are ruled
out due to their inadequacy with our constrained
network scenario. Doing so, we are then able to use just
2 bits encoding for the data type field instead of 8 bits in
the original version:
00: REQUEST_INIT
01: REQUEST_RESPONSE
10: TRANSFER_END
11: ERROR
 Verification V (VF): the VF field encoding is similar to
the non-compressed header. If it is set to 0, no
verification message is used. When it is set to 1, a
verification message is required.
 PRF func (PRF): if 0, the default PRF function defined
in Arkko et al. (2004) is used. If set to 1, the PRF
function value is carried inline.
 CSB ID (CSB): the CSB ID is chosen by the initiator
and needs to be unique between each initiator-responder
pair. Instead of carrying its 32 bits size inline, we
propose to derivate the CSB ID from the concatenation
of lower layer addresses. To guarantee uniqueness, we
require the use of unique identifiers such as 6LoWPAN
addresses, or physical addresses. One bit is sufficient for
the encoding. If set to 0, the CSB ID is derived instead
of being carried inline. If set to 1, the 32 bits CSB ID
are carried after the 6LoWPAN-NHC-HDR header.
 ] CS: if we assume in our constrained scenario that there
is only one CS in each CSB, there is no need therefore
for keeping 8 bits to indicate the number of crypto
sessions. We are then able to encode the ] CS with 1 bit.
If this bit is set to 0, only one CS is considered. In
addition, to make our compression flexible, if the bit is
set to 1, the number of CS is carried inline.
 CS ID map type(MT): if 0, the default GENERIC-ID
map type defined in Mattsson and Tian (2011) is used.
If set to 1, the CS ID map type is carried inline.
 CS ID map info (MI): the CS ID map info size is kept
variable in Mattsson and Tian (2011). If we assume that
there is only one CS in each CSB, we could use 1 bit for
the encoding. If 0, the unique CS is identified with its
corresponding mapping to the security protocol for
which security associations are created. If set to 1, the
map info field is carried inline.
The next payload field is always carried inline as it is
impossible to predict or deduce the next payload content. In
addition, the three last bits are used as padding bits to remain
standard compliant with RFC6282 (Hui and Thubert, 2011)
(NHC size is defined as 2 bytes long).
Figure 5 Our 6LoWPAN-NHC-HDR encoding compared to the
basic MIKEY’s header
Table 2 MIKEY-Ticket common header compression
MIKEY common Our
Field (sizes in bits) header 6LoWPAN-NHC-HDR
Version (V) 8 1
Data type (DT) 8 2
Next payload 8 8
Verification V (VF) 1 1
PRF func (PRF) 7 1
CSB ID (CSB) 32 1
] CS 8 1
CS ID map type (MT) 8 1
CS ID map info (MI) Variable length 1
6.2 New MIKEY-Ticket exchange mode
Our new communication exchange mode for MIKEY-Ticket
is designed to minimise the involvement of constrained
nodes. We consider the constrained node as the Initiator of
the protocol and the remote entity as the Responder. The
constrained node is in charge of requesting the establishment
of a session key with the remote entity and periodically
sending updates. We assume that I and R are sharing security
credentials with the KMS that is in charge of generating,
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deriving and delivering the required keyingmaterials. Besides,
AES-CTR (AES in Counter Mode) algorithm, which is
specified as mandatory-to-implement in RFC 3830 (Arkko
et al., 2004) is used for encryption. Also, AES-CBC (AES in
Cipher Block Chaining mode) is used for MAC computation.
Our communication exchange mode is depicted in Figure 6
and Table 1 summarises the different notations used. It is
worth mentioning here that although mode 2, mode 3 and
mode 4 (see Section 4.2.1) introduced in RFC 6043 (Mattsson
and Tian, 2011) reduce the number of exchanged messages
compared to the full three round-trip mode, they introduce
strong assumptions on the ability of both I and R to either
handle the generation and distribution of security credentials
or to share credentials prior to the start of the session. For these
reasons, our proposed exchange mode can be considered as
an extension of the proposed exchange modes defined in RFC
6043 (Mattsson and Tian, 2011). In fact, our new exchange
mode does not assume any capabilities regarding neither I
nor R as it is intended to be adaptable to constrained e-health
scenarios.
REQUEST_INIT : The Initiator starts the exchange process
by sending a REQUEST_INIT message to KMS. This
message contains the identities of I (IID), KMS (KMSID),
and R (RID). In addition, it contains a nonce NI
generated by I, which will be used as a session identifier.
Furthermore, node I computes a MAC using aKI;KMS
to ensure message authenticity. The message is then sent
to KMS. REQUEST_INIT has the following structure:
{[IID; RID;KMSID; NI ]eKI;KMS ,MAC}.
REQUEST_RESPONSE: when KMS receives the
REQUEST_INIT message, it validates the MAC using
aKI;KMS . Upon successful verifications, KMS decrypts
the message using eKI;KMS and retrieves the different
identities and the nonce NI . If the request is authorised,
KMS generates the requested key KI;R and uses the key
derivation function defined in RFC3830 (Arkko et al.,
2004) to derive both aKI;R and eKI;R. Then, KMS
constructs two versions of REQUEST_RESPONSE message.
The first message is intended to I. It is encrypted with
eKI;KMS and contains a MAC computed using aKI;KMS .
In addition, the message contains the nonce NI . The second
message is intended to R. It contains a MAC computed
using aKKMS;R and is encrypted using eKKMS;R. In
addition, KMS generates a nonce NKMS and includes it in
the message along with NI . The REQUEST_RESPONSE
is intended to node I, and has the following structure:
{[IID; RID;KMSID; aKI;R; eKI;R; NI ]eKKMS;I ;MACg.
The REQUEST_RESPONSE intended to R has the following
structure: {[IID; RID;KMSID; aKI;R; eKI;R; NI ;
NKMS ]eKKMS;R , MAC}. The two versions are then sent to I
and R.
TRANSFER_END: upon receiving a REQUEST_RESPONSE
message, R checks the freshness of NKMS and validates
the MAC using aKKMS;R. Upon successful verification,
R decrypts the message and retrieves both aKI;R and
eKI;R. Node I proceeds similarly and retrieves aKI;R and
eKI;R upon receiving REQUEST_RESPONSE message. R
constructs TRANSFER_END as a verification message. It
includes the nonce NI and computes a MAC using aKI;R.
The message is then sent to I. This message has the following
structure: {[IID; RID; NI ]eKI;R , MAC}. Upon receiving
TRANSFER_ENDmessage, node I checks the freshness ofNI
to avoid any replay attack and validates theMAC. A successful
verification is considered as a proof of R’s knowledge of both
aKI;R and eKI;R.
Our new communication exchange mode reduces therefore
the number of exchanged messages from 6 to 4 messages
compared to the basic MIKEY-Ticket defined in RFC 6043
(Mattsson and Tian, 2011) regardless of the ability of I and
R to generate, derive or distribute security credentials. As a
result, the constrained node processes and exchanges fewer
messages.
Figure 6 New MIKEY-Ticket exchange mode (see online version
for colours)
7 Analysis
In this section, we provide a detailed analysis of our proposed
tailoring for MIKEY-Ticket both in terms of security analysis
and energy consumption. Firstly, we conduct a theoretical
security analysis of our new exchange mode. In addition,
we analyse our protocol’s behaviour against the well-known
attacks that could hinder the establishment of a secure
channel in an e-health environment. Our analysis is then
validated using an automated validation tool called Avispa
(http://www.avispa-project.org) which is based on formal
models. After validating the security properties, we focus on
the energy gain of our approach. Different energy models
are used to estimate the total energy cost composed of
both computational and communication costs. The results are
compared with the basic version of MIKEY-Ticket.
7.1 Security analysis
7.1.1 Key exchange properties
The security features of our new MIKEY-Ticket exchange
mode have been assessed based on the properties presented in
Roman et al. (2011).We have added extra analysis concerning
integrity and confidentiality as we consider them critical for
e-health applications. Hereafter, our communication channel
is split into two parts or segments: Seg1) from the Initiator to
the KMS and Seg2) from the KMS to the responder.
 Confidentiality: The exchanged data between the
different entities involved in our protocol are kept
confidential. According to Arkko et al. (2004),
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AES-CTR is the default and mandatory-to-implement
encryption algorithm. Nowadays, more and more tiny
sensors include AES hardware coprocessors which help
to decrease the overhead. For Seg1, encryption is based
on the encryption key eKI;KMS shared between the
Initiator (constrained node) and the KMS, whereas in
Seg2, encryption is ensured by the use of the encryption
key eKKMS;R shared between the KMS and the
Responder (remote server). In addition, periodical
updates of the established keys are required in order to
strengthen the confidentiality and prevent long term
attacks.
 Authentication and integrity: By using MAC messages
either in Seg1 or in Seg2 communication parts, our new
exchange mode ensures that the exchanged data is
genuine. In particular, it ensures that data has not been
altered and has been sent from legitimate nodes. MAC
messages are computed and appended to the exchanged
messages based on AES-CBC mode using aKI;KMS in
Seg1 and aKR;KMS in Seg2. Furthermore, nonces (e.g.,
time-stamps or random values) are included in the
exchanged messages to avoid replay attacks.
 Distribution: The distribution of security credentials in
both communication segments is performed by an
offline dealer during the initialisation phase. This
constitutes one of the major drawbacks of key
distribution schemes based on a pre-shared context. In
return, these schemes simplify the cryptographic
operations (i.e., Symmetric) at the nodes side which is
highly desirable in constrained environments. Besides,
upon the establishment of a shared context, our new
exchange mode can be run in an online manner, which
allows autonomous update processing.
 Overhead: The computation overhead is particularly
low. Our compression scheme allows a considerable
improvement in energy consumption as the size of the
exchanged messages is reduced. Moreover, the
constrained nodes are involved in fewer messages
compared to the full three round-trip MIKEY-Ticket
mode (see Figures 1 and 6). Constrained nodes are thus
less solicited as they take advantage of the shared
pre-established context with the KMS. A more detailed
analysis regarding energy consumption is provided in
Section 7.2.
 Resilience: The resilience of our scheme is high. In fact,
the loss of a node and thus its key affects only the
corresponding sensor as each sensor only stores its
shared key with the KMS (i.e.,KR;KMS) and
eventually an established key with I (i.e.,KI;R). The
KMS maintains a different key with each constrained
node either for the pre-shared context or for the
generated shared key.
 Extensibility and scalability: Our network model allows
new sensors as well as new remote entities to be added
(e.g., we can imagine a physician prescribing the
implantation of a new sensor for medical reasons). An
offline dealer will have to establish a shared context
between the new entities and the KMS. No extra
operation is required from existing constrained nodes or
remote entities when new nodes join them. As a result,
high scalability is ensured which is particularly required
for constrained environments.
 Storage: Smart objects now provide considerable
amounts of storage space due to recent advances in flash
memory technology (Tsiftes and Dunkels, 2011).
Moreover, our new exchange mode does not add further
credentials to be stored in the constrained nodes. The
amount of data to be stored is limited, as only two keys
(i.e.,KR;KMS andKI;R) have to be stored. Storage
space will therefore not limit the deployment of our
scheme.
7.1.2 Protocol behaviour against e-health well-known
attacks
E-health applications are subject to several attacks that
threaten the establishment of secure channels (Li and Lou,
2010; Javadi and Razzaque, 2013; Lim et al., 2010). In this
section, we analyse the behaviour of our protocol against these
attacks. We focus on the attacks that occur in the network
and transport layers of the open system interconnection (OSI)
model.
Ensuring key freshness is an important concern with
regards to our new MIKEY-Ticket exchange mode. Indeed,
to provide the perfect forward secrecy property, the involved
entities have to be able to detect replayed messages. In
particular, e-health applications might be more vulnerable
compared to other types of applications as an outdated
information could lead to inadequate and serious medical
consequences. To overcome this issue, we have introduced
the use of nonces in the different exchanged messages. In
fact, these nonces are implemented using one of the following
strategies according to the network segment, and to the
constrained node capabilities:
 random numbers
 sequence numbers
 timestamps.
Random numbers might constitute a solution in our e-health
scenario. The constrained node (i.e., the Initiator) maintains
a list of the previous received random values in its internal
memory. Upon receiving a new message, the initiator checks
if the nonce has already been received. As a result, replayed
messages are detected. This solution brings a drawback; the
constrained node has tomaintain a list of the received nonces in
its internalmemory. This issue can be attenuated by the storage
capacity of newly developed nodes (Tsiftes and Dunkels,
2011). The second solution is based on sequence numbers,
which does not require any data storage. Sequence numbers
provide a sequential counter in the exchanged messages. In
the case where a message is replayed, its counter will be
smaller or equal to the current one. Thus, the message will
be dropped. However, if the KMS goes down (e.g., reboot,
10 M.R. Abdmeziem et al.
hardware failure, etc.), this protection is no longer effective.
In fact, the KMS will lose track of the current counter value.
Besides, to ensure message freshness, timestamps could also
be used. This solution is not suitable for constrained devices
as it consumes a lot of energy. In fact, synchronised clocks
have to be maintained between the KMS, the remote server,
and the constrained nodes.
Taking into account our network specifications, we
discuss the feasibility of the precedent solutions. It is
obvious thatmaintaining clock synchronisation betweenKMS
and the constrained nodes is not feasible. However, this
solution is adopted to protect the unconstrained part of the
network model, namely the channel linking the KMS with
the remote server (Seg2). In fact, the Responder and the
KMS are not able to challenge each other and they are
considered as non-constrained entities that are able tomaintain
clock synchronisation between them. Hence, the nonces are
implemented as timestamps. By doing so, the KMS and the
remote server will easily prevent replay attacks.
Regarding Seg1 communication part, our proposed
exchange mode allows the Initiator to challenge the KMS
about the nonce. In addition, the constrained node is not able to
maintain clock synchronisation with the KMS. Consequently,
the solution based on random numbers (or sequence numbers)
is adopted. If the storage capacity of smart objects is very
limited, the solution based on sequence numbers is preferred
at the expense of ensuring highly reliable entities with small
probabilities of failure. If storage capacity is not a concern, the
solution based on random numbers can be adopted. In brief,
protecting our new exchange mode against replayed messages
is achieved through the combination of the above discussed
strategies according to the network model specificities.
Denial of service (DoS) attacks could seriously threaten
the availability of our e-health application. In fact, the
gathered health-related data should always be available even
if the system is under a DoS attack. Like the basic version
of MIKEY-Ticket, our new exchange mode is protected
against DoS attacks by using the same techniques. In
particular, theKMSdoes not establish any internal state before
authenticating both the remote server and the constrained
nodes. The different parties share a long-term key with
the KMS. Each exchanged message is authenticated before
being processed. Besides, classical countermeasures such
as rate-limiting and access control list (ACL) could also
be implemented. Any malicious message would lead to an
abortion of the protocol execution. Node redundancy could
be another option. Whenever an entity is made unavailable
due to a DoS attack, the protocol execution carries on with
the redundant backup node. We refer to Arkko et al. (2004)
and Mattsson and Tian (2011) for a more detailed analysis of
MIKEY-Ticket behaviour regarding DoS attacks.
Sybil attacks (Douceur, 2002; Javadi and Razzaque, 2013)
where a node claims multiple fake identities could lead to
harmful consequences in the context of e-health applications.
Using these attacks, an intruder could use feigned identities to
send false information. As a result, either genuine emergency
situations are skipped, or ceaseless false emergency situations
are thrown. Our protocol is protected against Sybil attacks.
There is no way for a malicious node to perform a Sybil attack
unless the KMS (assumed to be a trusted entity) is corrupted.
In fact, long-term keys are shared between the KMS, the
Initiator (i.e., sensor) and the Responder (i.e., remote server).
Any exchanged message with the KMS contains the identity
of the sender, and is authenticated using the pre-shared long-
term keys. In addition, before any further processing, theKMS
checks its access control policy regarding the sender.
Another point of interest regarding the threat model in
e-health applications is the attacks that aim to drain the
energy power of sensors, and thereforemake them unavailable
or force them to enter a sleep mode. For instance, the
de-synchronisation attack targets the sequence number of
the exchanged messages. Actually, this will lead to infinite
retransmissions which waste both energy and bandwidth
resources. Providing message integrity is the main security
concern that hinders this type of attacks. In fact, MAC
messages are computed and checked for each exchanged
message ensuring that the included data has not been altered.
E-health applications are subject to several routing attacks.
Our key management protocol is not involved in securing the
routing process, instead, it aims to establish a secure channel
upon which the gathered data can be securely transmitted.
In fact, we rely on other mechanisms regarding this aspect.
Countermeasures usually involve the introduction of intrusion
detection systems (IDS) (Raza et al., 2013b; Le et al., 2012).
7.1.3 Formal validation
Several techniques have been introduced to model and
formally validate a security protocol regarding its properties.
Model checking (Clarke et al., 1999) is one of the
formal methods used to validate finite-state-concurrent
systems such as communication protocols. It usually
involves verification tools to exhaustively search all
possible execution sequences for desired properties in a
protocol specification. Many security protocols have been
validated through model checking (Tobarra et al., 2009;
Hanna et al., 2008), and several validation tools are
based on model checking (http://www.avispa-project.org,
http://www.prismmodelchecker.org, http://www.cs.utah.edu).
We highlight some advantages ofmodel checking compared to
classical approaches, which are developed around simulation,
testing, and deductions:
 Gives the possibility to the users to check every single
step of the execution process, allowing them to detect
any malfunction in a highly accurate way. However,
using simulation or testing, only a broad overview of
the protocol behaviour is provided. In addition, some
flaws might remain unfound until the protocol’s
production stage is initiated.
 Allows prompt and automated verifications through
different tools that implement model checking. In fact,
by adopting model checking, users can avoid
prototyping their protocols.
Automated validation of internet security protocol and
applications (AVISPA) is a state-of-the-art verification tool
for security protocols that includes a set of model checkers
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with a common front end. The tool follows the Dolev-Yao
intruder model (Dolev and Yao, 1981) to intercept messages
or to insert modified data. It performs analytical rules to state
whether the protocol is safe or not. In the case of unsafety,
the tool provides a trace highlighting the steps that led to
the attack. In fact, Avispa is considered as an effective tool
for the analysis of different internet security protocols and
applications. In the literature, several security protocols have
been validated through Avispa (Chun et al., 2011; Marino
and Caterina, 2011; Charu and Mathieu, 2009; Ruiz-Martínez
et al., 2006). Moreover, the security protocols standardised
by the IETF have been analysed by the AVISPA community
(e.g., IKE, TLS, AAA), and some of the protocols have
been found to be flawed (Moedersheim and Drielsma, 2003;
http://www.avispa-project.org).
The formal validation of our protocol was carried out
using the same Avispa tool to prove that our new exchange
mode does not violate the required security properties, in
particular, confidentiality, authentication, delivery proof and
replay protection. Protocol models in Avispa are written in a
role-based language called high-level protocol specification
language, or HLPSL (Chevalier et al., 2004). The actions of
the different entities are specified in amodule called basic role,
while their interactions are defined by composing multiple
basic roles together into a composed role. In addition, the
security goals of the analysed protocol are specified in the
goal section before launching the analysis. Besides, Avispa
uses four different automatic protocol analysis techniques
to validate the analysed protocol against the specified
security goals: on-the-flymodel-checker (OFMC), constraint-
logic based attack searcher (CL-AtSe), SAT-based model
checker (SATMC), and tree automata based on automatic
approximations for the analysis of security protocols (TA4SP).
In our modelling, we have first specified a basic role to
describe the actions of the different entities involved. Then, we
have specified how the participants interact with each other in
a composed role. The security goals against which the protocol
execution will be assessed have been specified in the goal
section. Particularly, we modelled the confidentiality property
of the generated KI;R, in addition to the authentication
property between the involved entities (i.e., I ,KMS, andR).
For clarity reasons, we present our modelling using Alice-
Bob (A B) notation, where:
 A: constrained node
 B: remote entity
 S: KMS.
The rest of the notations used are the same as those presented
in Table 1.
 A! S : fIID; RID;KMSID; NIgeKI;KMS ;MAC
 S ! A :
fIID; RID;KMSID; aKI;R; eKI;R; NIgeKKMS;A ;
MAC
 S ! B : fIID; RID;KMSID; aKI;R; eKI;R; NI ;
NKMS_eKKMS;B ;MAC
 B ! A : fIID; RID; NIgeKI;R ;MAC.
Upon completing modelling our exchange mode, we have
checked its correctness using a protocol animation tool
called SPAN (Glouche and Genet, 2006) that has been
introduced to help protocol developers in writing AVISPA
specifications. The security goalswere subsequently evaluated
by executing the four Avispa’s backends (i.e., OFMC, CL 
AtSe, SATMCandTA4SP). Besides, we have used the default
Dolev-Yao intrudermodelwhich allows simulating an intruder
that has full control over the network. All messages sent
and received by the different entities might be intercepted,
analysed, modified (as far as the keys are known), or sent to
other entities.
Figure 7 Avispa output (OFMC) (see online version for colours)
Figure 8 Avispa output (CL AtSe) (see online version
for colours)
The results of the simulation were indicated in reports for each
backend model produced by Avispa tool. Our new exchange
mode is ‘SAFE’ against OFMC (Figure 7), CL AtSe
(Figure 8) and SATMC (Figure 9). However, against TA4SP
database, the result was ‘INCONCLUSIVE’. According
to Avispa user manual (http://www.avispa-project.org), an
inconclusive result does not imply that an attack has been
detected (Figure 10). Consequently, based on the obtained
results, we can affirm that our protocol is safe regarding the
specified security goals. It is impossible for an attacker to
violate any of the specified security properties and disrupt the
functioning of the protocol.
Following our formal validation, we focus, in the next
section, on the energy cost savings achieved through our
new exchange mode and our header compression scheme.
The results are compared with the performances of the basic
version of MIKEY-Ticket.
Figure 9 Avispa output (SATMC) (see online version for colours)
7.2 Performance analysis
As explained above, our contribution focuses on tailoring
MIKEY-Ticket to the constrained environment of e-health
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applications. To this end, we propose a new header
compression scheme along with a new exchange mode to
reduce both the size of the exchanged messages and their
number. In this subsection, we provide a performance analysis
of our enhancements and compare energy consumption with
the basic MIKEY-Ticket. First, we describe the energy model
upon which our estimations are based. Then, we evaluate
the communication and computational costs regarding both
versions of MIKEY-Ticket (i.e., basic version and tailored
version). The analysis is concluded with a discussion of the
total energy cost highlighting the obtained energy savings.
Figure 10 Avispa output (TA4SP) (see online version for colours)
7.2.1 Energy model and assumptions
Meulenaer et al. (2008) have presented an energy evaluation
of wireless sensor nodes (WSN) regarding the communication
cost. This latter is composed of the costs of transmission,
reception and listening. Besides, the energy consumption of
AESencryption algorithmandSHA-1hash algorithmonWSN
nodes have been also assessed in Kaps and Sunar (2006). Both
implementations were processed on tiny nodes with fewMHz
of computational power, several kilobytes of RAMand several
tens of kilobytes of ROM.
In our evaluation, we consider the total energy cost as the
sum of the communication cost and the computational cost.
This latter is composed of encryption primitives based onAES
and authentication primitives based on SHA-1 as specified in
RFC 3830 (Saied and Olivreau, 2012). Based on the energy
measurements presented in Meulenaer et al. (2008) and Kaps
and Sunar (2006), we estimate the energy consumption of
tiny nodes regarding both communication and computational
aspects. The deduced values, summarised in Table 3, are used
as an energy model of the different operations on constrained
nodes. Transmission, reception, listening and cryptographic
operations costs are considered for the evaluation of the total
energy cost.
A set of assumptions is defined before diving into the
details of our evaluation:
 Our evaluation only covers energy consumption of the
constrained nodes as remote entities are not affected by
resources scarcity. Hence, the efforts of reducing energy
consumption are focused on the constrained part of the
network model.
 In the estimation of message sizes, we only take into
consideration the header part on which our compression
scheme is applied. The other parts of the exchanged
messages are constant regarding the two versions of
MIKEY-Ticket.
 MIKEY specification has left the CS ID map info
variable in length. In order to carry out our evaluation,
we assume a 2 bytes long field.
 In order to evaluate the gains in energy savings of our
compression scheme, we propose several levels of
compression rates. These rates simulate different
applications, each one defines a subset of fields to be
compressed using our proposed 6LoWPAN-NHC-HDR.
Table 4 presents the different compression rates along
with the corresponding compressed fields.
Table 3 Estimated energy costs on constrained nodes
Operation Cost (J)
Transmit 1 bit 0.72
Receive 1 bit 0.81
Listen for 1 ms 0.29
AES-128 128-bits encryption 28.11
SHA-1 128-bits MAC computation 23.9
Table 4 Different compression rates
Compression Compressed Gained space
rate (%) fields (bits)
0 None of the fields is compressed 0
16.4 V, DT 13
32.9 V, DT, PRF, MT 26
51.9 V, DT, PRF,] CS ,MI 41
72.1 V, DT, PRF, MT, CSB 57
83.5 V, DT,] CS, MI, CSB 66
100 All the fields are compressed 72
7.2.2 Communication cost
 Sending cost: The sending cost is estimated by
computing the overall size of the messages sent from
the constrained node for both MIKEY-Ticket’s versions.
The cost is then computed for different levels of
compression rate using the proposed energy model.
Table 5 summarises the results.
Table 5 Sending cost
Compression Size Number of Energy
rate (%) (Bits) messages cost (J)
Basic 0 96 02 138.24
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 16.4 83 01 59.76
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 32.9 70 01 50.4
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 51.9 55 01 39.6
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 72.1 39 01 28.08
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 83.5 30 01 21.6
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 100 24 01 17.28
MIKEY-Ticket
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 Receiving cost: The receiving cost is estimated by
computing the overall size of the messages sent to the
constrained node for both MIKEY-Ticket’s versions.
The cost is then computed for different levels of
compression rate using the proposed energy model.
Table 6 summarises the results.
 Listening cost: We consider the constrained node
listening for a period of time equal to the sum of
packets propagation delay (), packets computation
time (Comp), transmission latency (T ) and reception
latency (R). We assume the KMS being at one hop from
the constrained node and 150 ms propagation delay
needed for routing packets from the KMS to the remote
entity. Moreover, we assume both KMS and R being 100
times more powerful than the tiny node I for the
estimation of computational time. Furthermore, we
consider, for the estimation of communication latency,
an effective data rate of 75 kbps for a tiny node (e.g.,
TelosB) (Meulenaer et al., 2008). As an example, in the
basic MIKEY-Ticket exchange mode, between the
sending of REQUEST_INIT message and the reception
of REQUEST_RESP message, the constrained node
(CN) remains in the listening mode during the
following period of time:
Tlistening = R(KMS) + Comp(KMS) + T (KMS)
+(KMS! CN);
where
 R(KMS): Reception latency of KMS
 Comp(KMS): Computational time of KMS
 T(KMS): Transmission latency of KMS
 (KMS ! CN): Packets propagation delay
from KMS to CN.
The cost is computed for different levels of compression
rate, Table 7 summarises the results. We notice a slight
difference between the energy consumption of the two
versions of MIKEY-Ticket. This is due to the fact that
the listening time at the constrained node (i.e., I) is
based on the time spent by the unconstrained nodes
(i.e., KMS and R) to compute and communicate
MIKEY-Ticket messages. In fact, their unconstrained
resources make our tailoring’s impact less visible.
7.2.3 Computational cost
 Encryption cost: The encryption cost is estimated by
computing the overall size of the encrypted messages
exchanged with the constrained node for both
MIKEY-Ticket’s versions. The cost is then computed
for different levels of compression rate using the
proposed energy model. Table 8 summarises the results.
 Authentication cost: The authentication cost is
estimated by computing the overall size of the messages
exchanged with the constrained node on which a MAC
is appended. The estimation is done regarding both
MIKEY-Ticket’s versions. The cost is then computed
for different levels of compression rate using the
proposed energy model. Table 9 summarises the results.
Table 6 Receiving cost
Compression Size Number of Energy
rate (%) (Bits) messages cost (J)
Basic 0 96 02 155.52
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 16.4 83 02 134.46
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 32.9 70 02 113.4
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 51.9 55 02 89.1
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 72.1 39 02 63.18
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 83.5 30 02 48.6
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 100 24 02 38.88
MIKEY-Ticket
Table 7 Listening cost
Compression Listening Energy
rate (%) time (mS) cost (J)
Basic 0 155.23 45.01
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 16.4 153.32 44.5
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 32.9 152.72 44.3
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 51.9 152.1 44.1
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 72.1 151.5 43.9
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 83.5 151.2 43.8
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 100 150.9 43.7
MIKEY-Ticket
7.2.4 Discussion
Upon energy cost evaluation regarding both communication
and computational aspects, we have estimated the overall
energy cost considering both versions of MIKEY-Ticket. The
results are synthesised in Table 10. As shown in Figure 11,
we have already noticed a marked decrease in the first
compression rate (i.e., 16,4%) due to the introduction of
both new exchange mode and compression scheme which
reduces the size and the number of the exchanged messages.
Energy consumption keeps decreasing with the augmentation
of compression rate. In fact, nearly 74% less energy is required
to perform a full key exchange in the best case of our
compression scheme.
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Table 8 Encryption cost
Compression Size Number of Energy
rate (%) (Bits) messages cost (J)
Basic 0 96 04 84.33
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 16.4 83 03 54.68
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 32.9 70 03 46.11
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 51.9 55 03 36.23
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 72.1 39 03 25.69
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 83.5 30 03 19.76
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 100 24 03 15.81
MIKEY-Ticket
Table 9 Authentication cost
Compression Size Number of Energy
rate (%) (Bits) messages cost (J)
Basic 0 96 04 71.7
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 16.4 83 03 46.49
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 32.9 70 03 39.21
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 51.9 55 03 30.80
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 72.1 39 03 21.84
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 83.5 30 03 16.80
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 100 24 03 13.44
MIKEY-Ticket
Table 10 Total energy cost
Total
Compression Communication Computational energy
rate (%) cost cost cost
Basic 0 338.77 156.03 494.8
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 16.4 238.72 101.17 339.89
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 32.9 208.1 85.32 293.42
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 51.9 172.8 67.03 239.83
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 72.1 135.16 47.53 182.69
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 83.5 114 36.56 150.56
MIKEY-Ticket
Tailored 100 99.86 29.26 129.11
MIKEY-Ticket
The obtained results were expected as the reduction of both
size and number of messages leads to a decrease in the
energy spent either in the processing or in the communication
of data. Nevertheless, an additional processing overhead is
expected due to the compression/decompression operations
of 6LoWPAN packets. As we consider the KMS being
unconstrained, we can safely assume that the generated
overheadwill be supported by the KMS acting as a 6LoWPAN
border router (6BR).
Figure 11 Total energy consumption on a constrained node for
basic and tailored MIKEY-Ticket regarding different
compression rates
Figure 12 Energy consumption evolution through several
rekeying operations for both MIKEY-Ticket versions
regarding different compression rates
Additionally, we have compared the energy cost of several
rekeying operations regarding different compression rates
(see Figure 12). Frequent updates are likely to be performed
in order to avoid long term attacks. The results show a
considerable gain in the energy consumption that increases
with the increase of rekeying operations. It is worth noticing
that the gain is more important with the increase of rekeying
operations which is critical for tiny nodes with highly
constrained resources (e.g., increasing battery lifetime).
The analysis study allowed us to validate our proposition
from two perspectives. First of all, we have provided a
theoretical analysis regarding the different security properties
required in our network scenario. The properties analysis
has been validated using Avispa tool. Furthermore, we have
proceeded with a quantitative analysis to highlight energy
savings resulting from our tailoring of MIKEY-Ticket. The
simulation showed the viability of the proposed solutions on
e-health environments that are based on highly constrained
sensor nodes. In a nutshell, our proposed solutions make
MIKEY-Ticket more lightweight while its security properties
are preserved.
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8 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we have introduced a tailoring mechanism
for Mickey-Ticket to adapt it to low-power and constrained
environment of e-health devices and applications. To this
end, we have proposed a new header compression scheme
to reduce the size of messages from 12 Bytes to 3 Bytes in
the best compression case. In addition, we have introduced a
new exchange communication mode to reduce the number of
exchanged messages from 6 to 4. We have evaluated our new
solutions with respect to security and energy saving aspects.
The results demonstrate that our approach keeps MIKEY-
Ticket safe while a considerable amount of energy is saved
at the constrained node side. Hence, we can claim that our
adjustments of MIKEY-Ticket protocol are well-adapted to
IoT constrained environments such as e-health applications. In
the future, we are going to investigate the applicability of our
tailored MIKEY-Ticket for group communication scenarios,
and the eventual impact of mobility on the architectural
entities.
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